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Sammendrag 
Empiriske analyser av hvorvidt FoU-subsidier til private bedrifter fortrenger disse bedriftenes egne 
FoU-investeringer er beheftet med seleksjonsproblemer. Spesielt kan det være slik at bedriftenes 
intensjoner om FoU-investeringer og kvaliteten på forskningsideene kan være korrelert med 
sannsynligheten for å søke og motta støtte. Det har vært foreslått å bruke data fra søknadsevalueringer 
for å løse dette seleksjonsproblemet. Ved bruk av slike data fra Norge finner vi ingen sterk støtte for 
en hypotese om at seleksjon av denne typen gir sterk skjevhet i estimatene for effekten av FoU-
subsidier på FoU-investeringene. Karakterer fra søknadsevalueringer er en sterk prediktor for FoU-
investeringer og reduserer skjevheten i estimater basert på tverrsnittsdata. Det er imidlertid lite 
variasjon i prosjektkarakterer for samme bedrift over tid, noe som tyder på at prosjektkvalitet i stor 
grad fanges opp av bedriftsspesifikke effekter. Vårt foretrukne estimat på effekten av FoU-subsidier på 
bedriftens FoU-investeringer (addisjonaliteten) er 1,15, dvs. at en krone i subsidier medfører litt mer 
en enn krone økning i FoU-investeringer. Vi viser imidlertid at det er betydelig målefeil i 
subsidievariabelen i vårt datasett. Dette medfører at addisjonaliteten sannsynligvis er underestimert, og 
at målefeil kan være en viktigere kilde til skjevhet enn seleksjon når man benytter paneldata.    
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1. Introduction 
The public good nature of innovation and R&D investments has attracted economists’ attention for 
several decades and constitutes the principal justification for subsidies to commercial R&D. There is, 
however, little consensus in the literature with respect to the effects of such programmes. Do subsidies 
to commercial R&D crowd out or stimulate private R&D investments? David, Hall and Toole (2000) 
survey 32 studies and conclude that “the findings overall are ambivalent”. Garcia-Quevedo (2004) 
conducts a meta-analysis of 74 results from 39 studies, and concludes similarly that “the econometric 
evidence … is ambiguous”. Finally, Bronzini and Iachini (2011) list eleven papers published during 
the last decade and find that only half of them confirm a positive role for public R&D incentives. 
Given the large amount of public resources devoted to R&D subsidies in all OECD economies, it is 
important to resolve this ambiguity.  
 
One likely explanation for the lack of clear evidence is econometric problems related to selection, see 
David, Hall and Toole (2000), Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000), Jaffe (2002) and Cerulli (2010) for 
surveys. Wallsten (2000) explains the basic problem in one sentence: “Regressing some measure of 
innovation on the subsidy can establish a correlation between grants and R&D, but it cannot determine 
whether grants increase firm R&D or whether firms that do more R&D receive more grants.” In order 
to identify the causal effect of R&D subsidies one must answer the following counter-factual question: 
What would subsidised firms have done if they did not receive subsidies?  
 
Typically, subsidised firms are more R&D intensive than average firms, hence regressing R&D 
subsidies on private R&D investments will lead to a severe positive bias in the effect estimate. The 
standard remedy for this selection problem is to include a firm fixed effect or, equivalently, analyse 
the effect of a change in subsidies on the change in private R&D investments. This methodology was 
first introduced by Lichtenberg (1984). Firm fixed effects will pick up aspects such as R&D 
experience, networks and experience with the application process and technological opportunities in 
the firm’s product group. As pointed out by Klette et al. (2000), however, there may be unobserved 
transitory effects that invalidates fixed effects estimation in this context. Firms are more likely to 
apply for subsidies when they have particularly good projects and a particularly good chance of 
receiving subsidies. At the same time, when firms have particularly good projects one would expect 
them to undertake more R&D than usual even without subsidies. Kauko (1996) discusses this 
endogeneity problem in a cross-sectional setting and asserts that “applications for financial support 
filed by a firm are certainly highly dependent on its intention to invest in R&D.”  
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Finding instrumental variables that solve this endogeneity problem is very challenging, as 
demonstrated for example by the conflicting results of Lerner (1999) and Wallstein (2000). Both 
analyse the effects of the SBIR-programme in the US using an IV approach. Reflecting on these 
difficulties, Jaffe (2002) suggests that evaluation should be built into the design of public research 
support programmes. More specifically, he notes that in a “canonical research programme” the agency 
that disburses money for research typically solicits evaluation reports from outside experts and then 
organises a committee to rank or group the proposals in terms of priority for funding. The agency 
decides which proposals to fund, based on the available budget, the recommendations of the 
committee and possibly other criteria not related to proposal quality such as gender, geography and 
balancing of the grant portfolio e.g. by scientific field. Data generated by such a process can 
potentially solve the selection problem. To put it simply, Jaffe’s idea is to compare projects right 
above and below the quality cut-off line used by the agency, and also to utilise the randomisation of 
funding that criteria not related to project quality creates in the data. He suggests using an estimator 
based on the regression discontinuity design. 
 
Typically, the proposal quality data envisaged by Jaffe is produced, but not recorded systematically 
and made available to researchers by grant awarding agencies. Although Jaffe’s article is well cited, 
we are only aware of three studies that try to implement his estimation strategy; Jacob and Lefgren 
(2011), Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) and a very recent contribution by Bronzini and Iachini 
(2011).1 The first two studies evaluate funding of academic research while Jaffe’s main concern was 
the effectiveness of support to commercial R&D. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) analyse subsidies to 
commercial R&D, but lack data for the firms’ R&D investments. Instead, they rely on balance sheet 
data and use investments – intangible, tangible and total – as their preferred outcome variable. 
 
In the current paper we explore the value of proposal quality data, gathered by the Research Council of 
Norway, in estimating the effect of support to industry-led R&D. The Research Council of Norway 
has for several years emphasised program evaluation, and proposal quality data is available in the 
PROVIS database established in 1999. We match the PROVIS evaluation data to the Norwegian 
Business Enterprise R&D statistics that are part of the joint OECD/Eurostat R&D survey, and we 
discuss different ways of using the available data to identify the causal effect of R&D subsidies on 
firms’ R&D investments. The effect we attempt to identify is the average effect on firms, conditional 
                                                     
1 A fourth relevant study is Serrano-Velarde (2008) using quantile regressions and regression discontinuity to estimate the 
impact of R&D subsidies on firm R&D investment under the French ANVAR programme. Serrano-Velarde utilises a 
discontinuity resulting from program specific eligibility requirements related to form of ownership, rather than proposal 
evaluation grades. We briefly summarise studies that use the regression discontinuity design in Appendix B. 
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on the existence and scale of the entire subsidy programme of the Research Council and alternative 
public sources. 
 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we discuss some practical limitations of the regression 
discontinuity design suggested by Jaffe (2002). One concern is aggregation from proposal data to 
annual firm level R&D data when there are many proposals per firm and when the proposed projects 
last for several years. A more important limitation is that there are many different sub-programmes 
with different and unclear thresholds for granting subsidies. This problem is related partly to the fact 
that there are several quality rankings for various aspects of a single proposal, and that it is not entirely 
clear which one is the most relevant. 
 
Second, because of the difficulties in implementing the regression discontinuity design, we suggest an 
alternative approach using the variables from the proposal evaluation database as proxies. Proposal-
quality grades have previously been used as a proxy variable in the literature on the effect of R&D 
support on scientific productivity, but to the best of our knowledge not in studies analysing the effect 
of subsidies to commercial R&D. 2 A particularly interesting variable in this respect is the evaluation 
panel’s expectation of commercial benefit, i.e. the proposed project’s contribution to firm profits. This 
variable can act as a proxy for a firm’s incentive to invest in R&D, and therefore also for the intention 
to invest. When combining this commercial-benefits proxy with unobserved fixed effects, we find, 
somewhat to our surprise, that the bulk of variation in proposal grades is across firms rather than 
within firms. This suggests that including firm fixed effects largely solves the selection problem. 
 
Third, comparing data on subsidies reported both by the firms and the granting agency, we document 
that there is substantial measurement error in the subsidy variable. This will cause a negative bias in 
the additionality estimates, in particular in specifications that control for unobserved firm fixed effects 
(cf. Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
 
In the course of our analysis we present a series of estimates obtained under alternative assumptions 
and model specifications. Our preferred point estimates suggest that the short-run additionality of 
subsidies from the Research Council of Norway is positive and in the interval 1.0 to 1.3, i.e., a one-
unit increase in the subsidy increases total R&D expenditure in the recipient firm by somewhat more 
                                                     
2 Arora and Gambardella (2005) estimate the effect of grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the USA on 
impact weighted publications in a five-year window following the grant decision. One of their control variables is the average 
reviewer score of the proposal, ranging from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very poor). See also Chudnovsky, López, Rossi and Ubfal 
(2008) for a related analysis. 
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than one unit. Using a log-log specification, we find that the elasticity of total R&D with respect to 
subsidies is about 0.20, suggesting that an increase in subsidies gives rise to a moderate increase in 
total R&D. Hence, there is no evidence that subsidies to commercial R&D crowd out private 
investments. In light of the many difficulties presented above, our results should be interpreted with 
caution. Given the extent of measurement errors that we document, however, we believe that our 
estimates are more likely to be too low than too high. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses further the selection problem and the 
approach proposed by Jaffe (2002). Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains our econometric 
analysis and Section 5 concludes. We include three appendixes. Appendix A provides an overview of 
the various dimensions of a research proposal that is assessed as part of the evaluation process in the 
Research Council of Norway. Appendix B discusses some relevant studies using regression 
discontinuity. Appendix C reports the results of an attempt to use evaluation grades as instruments 
rather than proxies. 
2. Selection and proposal evaluation data as a potential remedy 
The challenge of establishing the counterfactual in the case of governmental support for R&D comes 
from the fact that recipients of support typically are not a random sample of all possible recipients. 
Jaffe (2002) discusses this selection issue in detail and considers the following version of the standard 
model (p. 25 and 31): 3 
 
(1) it i i it i t it itY D Xβ λ α μ ω ε= + + + + +  
 
where Yit is total R&D expenditure of an applicant, or potential applicant, i in year t, and Di is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the applicant has received a grant. Xit is a set of firm- and time-
varying covariates, and there are four unobservable determinants of research output. First, there is an 
unobserved firm-specific effect, iα , and a common unobserved time effect, tμ . Next, there is a time- 
and firm specific effect, itω , which is unobservable by the econometrician, but observable by the 
granting agency. Finally, there is a genuine error term, itε , that is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xit 
and Di. The key challenge is that Di may be correlated with itω  and iα  because of selection on iβ . 
                                                     
3 On page 25, Jaffe sets up the equation and discusses the effect of public support on R&D output. However, on page 31, he 
makes it clear that the same selection problems apply when the dependent variable is total R&D expenditure; i.e., when 
estimating input additionality as we do in this paper. See also his equation (2b) on page 32. 
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(An agency trying to maximise the impact of its funding will order the projects according to the iβ ’s 
and choose as many of the high iβ -projects as possible. This translates into a selection problem 
because iβ  is likely to be correlated with itω  and iα .) The firm fixed effects can be eliminated using 
panel data methods, whereas the time-varying unobserved effect, itω , cannot.  
 
Regression discontinuity design (see, e.g., Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), requires that the granting 
agency constructs one single variable that sums up the quality of the proposal, and that can be 
transformed into a unique value for each firm and year. The rate of acceptance should increase in the 
ranking, jump clearly at one threshold and not jump at other points. The ranking, if incomplete, should 
have a sufficient range and there must be a sufficient number of data points on either side of the 
threshold. Furthermore, the method requires that the relationship between the quality ranking and 
outcome is smooth around the threshold. The regression discontinuity design as proposed by Jaffe 
implies using a dummy variable for a ranking above the threshold as an instrument for Di, while 
conditioning on the quality ranking itself. This will identify the effect of receiving a grant on Y in a 
“small” region around the threshold. 
 
The necessary data requirements, however, are not always fulfilled. As we will demonstrate below, the 
proposal quality data from the Research Council of Norway which we believe are typical for similar 
support programs in other countries, do not seem fully compatible with the regression discontinuity 
design.4 For this reason we chose instead to use the quality ranking as a conditioning proxy variable 
and to control for unobserved firm-specific effects using a standard fixed effects estimator. However, 
while the regression discontinuity design only requires that we condition on what the granting agency 
knows, the proxy solution requires that the evaluation data capture all factors that affect both the 
probability of receiving a subsidy and the R&D investment decisions. It is not obvious that external 
experts can evaluate the private or social returns to commercial R&D projects with any precision, and 
this caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our core data source is the project databases PROVIS and FORISS of the Research Council of 
Norway. Matching these unique datasets to administrative registers and censuses for firms, such as the 
                                                     
4 In the future, data that identify which applications were competing directly against each other for funding at a certain point 
in time, will become available. It is then likely that we will observe a more clear quality cut-off in the grant awarding process 
and be able to use a regression discontinuity approach.  
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R&D survey and structural statistics of Statistics Norway, we get a data set that provides detailed 
information on firms and research support proposals. 
3.1. Data sources and key variables 
The PROVIS database contains information on every application to the Research Council of Norway 
for R&D subsidies. The information includes a unique firm identification number, the grades obtained 
in the evaluation of the proposal with respect to a number of criteria and the project’s start and end 
year. Information on projects that did not receive support is also recorded. Data on the annual amount 
received as subsidies have been added by the Research Council of Norway from their FORISS 
database. The PROVIS evaluation scheme was introduced gradually from 1999. We have access to all 
applications from private-sector firms until 2008.5 Firms apply for funding from specific thematic 
programmes within the Research Council of Norway, and each programme is administered by a 
programme board. The various programmes have different scale (total amount of subsidies). Some 
programmes exist for a short period, others continue over many years. Applications follow an 
announcement of available funding within a given programme, and a deadline is set. Applicants for 
funding from a given programme then compete with each other for a fixed pool of available funds. 
The frequency of announcements varies over programs, and firms may be eligible under more than 
one programme.  
 
The programmes analysed seek to promote R&D initiatives in industrial circles and comprise the 
Research Council of Norway's main instrument for achieving its industry-oriented R&D objectives. 
The programmes are of the matching grants type, and funding requires at least 50 % co-financing from 
private enterprise. Formally, the average co-financing is 60-65 %.6 As pointed out by Klette and Møen 
(2012), however, it is an open question as to what extent this induces firms to increase their total R&D 
investments because they may reduce non-subsidised R&D activities upon receiving an R&D grant. 
 
The R&D survey conducted by Statistics Norway is our source of information on R&D investments. 
The survey has been conducted at the firm level annually since 2001 (every second year before that) 
and includes all private sector firms with at least 50 employees. Among firms with 10-49 employees, 
all firms that reported R&D activity in the previous survey are included. Among the remaining firms 
with 10-49 employees a stratified sample (by industry and size) is used. The 2006 survey also includes 
                                                     
5 This is industry led R&D or “user directed innovation programmes” (BIP) in the terminology of the Research Council of 
Norway. See http://www.rcn.no/en/Research_programmes/1184159006970. 
6 The rules for how to calculate the co-financing were perceived to be rather lenient in the period we have data for. The 
correct number may therefore be closer to 50 %. 
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a sample of firms with 5-9 employees. The surveys include approximately 4500 firms each year. The 
R&D statistics include, among other things, information on intramural R&D and R&D subsidies 
received from various sources. Data on sales are obtained from firm statistics collected separately by 
Statistics Norway. The use of unique firm identifiers throughout enables us to link data from different 
sources. We merge firms that are represented in the R&D statistics in at least one of the years between 
2001 and 2007 with firms’ project proposals from the PROVIS database during the same time period.  
 
Because the R&D survey only covers a subset of firms with less than 50 employees, we are not able to 
use all applications in the PROVIS database. Table 1A shows the match between the two data sources. 
There are 13497 firms represented in the R&D surveys in the years 2001 to 2007, but many of these 
do not conduct R&D. The PROVIS database includes 1480 firms and 4463 applications that have at 
least one year of proposed activity within the period 2001-2007. There are 631 firms that are 
represented both in the R&D surveys and in the PROVIS database. These firms have altogether 2444 
applications for support, i.e. an average of almost four per firm. 49 % of the firms have only one 
application, 82 % have at most three, and 96 % have at most 10 applications. Within any given year, 
between 30 and 36 % of the firms that received subsidies from the Research Council of Norway, 
received subsidies for more than one project. 
 
In the regression analysis that follows, we want to focus on R&D-performing firms. Hence, we 
exclude from our sample firms that are never observed with positive R&D. Moreover, since we will 
estimate regressions with firm fixed effects, we also exclude firms that are observed only once. These 
firms will not contribute to identification. In Table 1B, we show the match between the remaining 
firms and the PROVIS database. Of 2570 R&D-performing firms with at least two observations in the 
R&D surveys, 446 firms have applied for R&D subsidies and are included in the PROVIS database.  
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Table 1. Match between firms in and the project evaluation database, PROVIS the R&D 
surveys 
A: All firms  B: Firms present in the regression sample Number of firms   
(number of applications) Firm present in the PROVIS database Firm present in the PROVIS database 
  Yes No All   Yes No All 
Yes 631 (2444) 12866 13497  Yes 446 (2048) 2124 2570 
Firm present in R&D surveys 
No 849 (2019) - 849  No - - - 
 All 1480 (4463) 12866 14346  All 446 (2048) 2124 2570 
Firms in the R&D surveys 2001-2007 and firms in the PROVIS database with proposed activity 2001-2007. Part B of the 
table includes firms in the R&D surveys that are observed at least twice, and at least once with positive R&D. 
 
There are altogether 11368 firm-year observations of the 2570 firms in our regression sample. This 
implies that there are on average 4.4 observations per firm.  
3.2. Aggregating proposal data to the firm level 
The PROVIS and FORISS databases are organised with project proposals as the unit of observation, 
whereas the remaining data, and hence the analyses, are at the firm level. This makes it necessary to 
aggregate from the proposal level to the firm level. This aggregation concerns two sets of variables, 
proposal evaluations and the associated project subsidies. Aggregating subsidies is simple. We use the 
sum of subsidies paid out each year in all projects for each firm.  
 
With respect to evaluations, we want to measure the quality of research ideas, where quality to the 
firm means the expected present discounted value of future profits generated by money invested in 
R&D now, and thus the strength of the incentive to invest in R&D. To achieve this we compute the 
average grade across all proposals for which the proposed period of activity spans the current year.7 
Proposals are evaluated along a number of dimensions, or aspects, resulting in a number of aspect-
specific grades. In addition, an overall grade “Total evaluation” is given.  The mean of grade j is 
named MGj. We focus on MG11, “Total evaluation”, MG5, “Commercial benefit”, and MG6, 
“Relevance and benefit to society”. Almost 60 % of the aggregated firm-year level grades are based on 
only one project proposal. The average number of proposal level grades behind each aggregated firm-
year level grade is 2.2. The maximum number of underlying grades is 33. 
3.3. Subsidy measures 
Our data sources contain two measures of R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. One 
measure is self-reported subsidies by the firms in the R&D survey (SR). The other measure comes 
                                                     
7 We have also used the maximum grade instead of the mean, and this did not change results materially. 
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from the Research Council’s FORISS database (SC). The FORISS database includes information on 
realized projects for firms in the PROVIS database that had their proposals accepted. In principle, the 
two measures should correspond. Table 2 shows that the two measures do not correspond well, in the 
sense that one is often zero when the other is strictly positive. Of the 1132 observations with SC>0 or 
SR >0, both are positive in 449 cases. When both are positive, the coefficient of correlation is 0.70.8 In 
a bivariate regression, and within the classical measurement error model, this would cause the OLS 
regression coefficient to be attenuated by 30 % if the two measures are of equal quality. 
Table 2. Correspondence between subsidy measures from the R&D surveys (SR) and the Re-
search Council (SC) 
 SR=0 SR>0 Total 
SC=0 10236 278 10514 
SC>0 405 449 854 
Total 10641 727 11368 
The numbers given in the table are firm-year observations. SR is subsidies reported in the R&D surveys. SC is subsidies 
reported in the FORISS database. 
 
We have checked that periodising is not the main reason why the correspondence between the two 
subsidy measures is poor. Reporting of subsidies at different firm identification numbers is a possible 
explanation. This error could occur if subsidies are assigned to different firms within a business group 
in the R&D survey and in the proposal to the Research Council of Norway, or perhaps if firms change 
identification numbers over time, but that happens only in rare incidents. The most important source of 
error is probably that the Research Council registers the entire subsidy on the lead firm in projects 
where two or more firms participate. With respect to self-reported subsidies, errors arise because the 
person filling in the questionnaire is not accurate enough in finding the exact numbers or in allocating 
received subsidies to the right governmental agency.9 10 
 
In addition to subsidies from the Research Council of Norway, firms can receive R&D subsidies from 
EU bodies (SEU) and from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and some other public sources. 
Innovation Norway is a government agency for the promotion of nationwide industrial development. 
In the R&D surveys subsidies from ministries, Innovation Norway and others are combined in one 
                                                     
8 Under the assumptions of the classical errors-in-variables model and if the two measures are of equal quality, this 
correlation – known as the reliability ratio – measures the fraction of the variance in reported subsidies that is due to true 
variation in subsidies. See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) or Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001). 
9 Some measurement errors could probably be avoided by pooling subsidies from different sources, but then we could not 
estimate the degree of additionality associated with each specific source. The degree of additionality is likely to vary between 
sources, e.g. because some public financing is given as matching grants subsidies and some as contract R&D. 
10 See Finne (2011) for an assessment of the accuracy of the Norwegian R&D survey. 
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variable (SG). It is important to account for subsidies from sources other than the Research Council of 
Norway, because subsidies may be correlated. Omitting subsidies from alternative sources will then 
lead to bias in the estimated additionality associated with the subsidies from the Research Council. 
The presence of measurement error in the subsidy variables implies that our estimates of additionality 
will be biased towards zero. However, under certain assumptions we may exploit the fact that we have 
two subsidy measures to obtain better estimates of the true additionality by using an instrumental 
variables model. We return to this in section 4.5. 
 
Table 3 describes the correspondence between R&D investments and R&D subsidies. About 10 % of 
the observations with positive R&D investments report positive subsidies. Among observations with 
zero R&D investments, 66 observations have nonzero subsidies as reported by the Research Council 
(SC).  
Table 3. R&D investment and subsidy measures from the R&D surveys (SR) and the Re-
search Council (SC) 
 SR=0 SR>0 SC=0 SC>0 Total 
Intramural R&D =0 3296 0 3230 66 3296 
Intramural R&D >0 7345 727 7284 788 8072 
Total 10641 727 10514 854 11368 
The numbers given in the table are firm-year observations. Intramural R&D and the SR–subsidy measure are reported in the 
R&D surveys. The SC–subsidy measure is reported in the FORISS database. 
3.4 Proposal evaluations and R&D investments 
The project proposals are evaluated on 11 aspects. Five of these are evaluated by external scientific 
experts, the remainder by the Research Council of Norway. Aspect 11, ‘Total evaluation’, is evaluated 
by the Research Council of Norway taking into consideration the external experts’ evaluations. See 
Table A1 in the appendix for the aspects and a short summary of the assessment criteria. All aspects 
except ‘Risk’ and ‘Other conditions’ are evaluated on a scale from 1 to 7 with 7 being the top grade. 
When deciding on the subsidies, the programme board in charge may decide to grant subsidies to 
many or few of the applicants, they may subsidise only parts of a given project proposal, or for a 
shorter period than was applied for. This varies across programmes, and may be endogenous to the 
number and quality of proposals. In most cases, however, the granted subsidy is close to the amount 
applied for if the proposal receives a subsidy. 
 
Subsidies are only available at certain points in time, and the timing of announcements, proposal 
deadlines, programme duration and amount of subsidies available can be regarded as exogenous from 
the firm’s point of view. This introduces random variation in received subsidies, and thus alleviates to 
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some extent the problem of endogeneity of contemporaneous subsidies in an equation that explains 
intramural R&D.11 
 
Table 4 shows the number of proposals and the acceptance rate by grades of Aspect 11, ‘Total 
evaluation’ and Aspect 5, ‘Commercial benefits’, before aggregation to the firm level. Grades are 
concentrated in the range 3-6, and it is difficult to identify one jump point. Without a clear threshold, 
and observing that there are de facto only four grade levels assigned, it is difficult to apply the 
approach advocated by Jaffe (2002) to these data. However, the original endogeneity problem arises 
from an omitted variable. The omitted variable is the potential returns to R&D investments to the firm, 
and the evaluation data may provide good proxies for this variable.  
 
In the following, we focus on Aspect 5, ‘Commercial benefits’. This variable measures the evaluation 
panel’s expectation of the contribution to profits from the proposed project. It should therefore be a 
useful proxy for the quality of current project ideas in the firm that also affects the decision to invest in 
R&D. Table 4 shows that the acceptance rate increases with MG5, but of course less strongly than 
with MG11, because Aspect 5 is only one of several aspects behind Aspect 11. 
Table 4. Number of proposals and acceptance rate by grades 
 Aspect 11: Total evaluation Aspect 5: Commercial benefits 
Grade Number of proposals Acceptance rate Number of proposals Acceptance rate 
1 9 0 % 3 33 % 
2 41 0 % 16 31 % 
3 102 2 % 96 33 % 
4 257 35 % 431 49 % 
5 510 73 % 426 71 % 
6 362 92 % 152 71 % 
7 16 100 % 8 100 % 
Missing 743 35 % 908 45 % 
Proposal level data. 
                                                     
11 Note, however, that programmes may be anticipated and that the launching of programmes may be correlated with 
technological opportunities. 
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Table 5. Variables by grade for Aspect 5: Commercial benefits (MG5) 
MG5 (rounded up to 
nearest integer) N 
Share with 
Intramural R&D 
>0 
Mean 
Intramural 
R&D, if >0 
Share with 
SR>0 
Share with 
SC>0 
Mean sales 
(Mill. 
NOK) 
1 2 0.50 135 0.00 0.50 16 
2 6 1.00 9996 0.00 0.33 150 
3 52 0.79 6666 0.19 0.33 262 
4 289 0.91 21763 0.39 0.58 1003 
5 514 0.92 41398 0.44 0.78 3453 
6 165 0.90 43436 0.41 0.76 1193 
7 10 1.00 36747 0.60 1.00 1232 
Missing 252 0.89 12126 0.25 0.51 744 
Did not apply 10078 0.69 3795 0.02 0.00 361 
Total 11368      
All firm year observations. Grade data from proposals have been aggregated to the firm level as explained in section 3.2. SC 
is subsidies reported in the FORISS database. SR is subsidies reported in the R&D surveys. 
 
Table 5 shows how R&D investment, sales and the incidence of subsidies vary by whether the firm 
has applied for support from the Research Council of Norway, and by the average evaluation of 
Aspect 5, ‘Commercial benefits’, for proposals if it did apply. Firms that did not apply are smaller in 
terms of sales, are less likely to invest in R&D, and invest far less than applicants if they do invest. 
Among applicants, there is also a clear positive relationship between grade and R&D investment as we 
would expect: When firms have particularly good research ideas, they invest more in developing them. 
However, some of this positive correlation may be because of size, as grades tend to increase with 
average sales. The relationship between grade and whether or not the applicant invests is less strong 
for average grades above 3, suggesting that when project quality exceeds a certain level, the decision 
to invest or not is mainly governed by factors less closely related to proposal quality, i.e., grades seem 
to matter more for the intensive margin than for the extensive margin. Finally, grades aggregated to 
the firm level are related closely to whether or not the Research Council of Norway grants support. 
This is as expected although one may question why projects with a top grade on commercial benefit 
should receive public support.  Even in these cases, however, public support is warranted if the 
technological risk is high or the firms are liquidity constrained. 
 
The fixed effects analyses rely on variation in grades over time within firms. Using only firm-year 
observations where the firm has applied for support and where MG5 is non-missing, 122 firms have at 
least two different values of this variable in two different years, and account for 729 valid 
observations, of which 559 have non-zero MG5. Among the 559 observations, the variance of MG5 
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cleansed of within-firm means is 0.24, ranging from -1.5 to 2. It is essentially this variation we use to 
control for the time varying incentive to invest in R&D when we account for firm fixed effects.  
 
Because the fixed effects approach with grades as proxies for research intentions relies on a limited 
number of firms and limited variation in grades, we will also use a dynamic model where firm fixed 
effects are replaced by a lagged dependent variable. 
3.5. Summary statistics 
Table 6 gives summary statistics for key variables. Sales are measured in NOK million, R&D 
investment and subsidies are measured in NOK 1000, all deflated by the consumer price index to base 
year 2000. We note that the distributions of sales and intramural R&D are highly skewed, with the 
means exceeding the medians by a factor of 8 and 4.5, respectively.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for main variables 
 N Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Sales 11368 69.3 537.9 5207.8 
Intramural R&D 8072 2150.4 9515.8 36273.1 
Subsidies from the Research Council in the R&D surveys (SR) 727 679.6 1456.2 2207.4 
Subsidies from the Research Council in the FORISS database (SC) 854 947.8 1753.1 2485.9 
Subsidies from ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies (SG) 728 442.8 3872.3 29355.4 
Subsidies from EU bodies (SEU) 280 568.7 1654.5 2814.8 
Share of SR in Intramural R&D  727 0.08 0.14 0.18 
Evaluation of commercial benefit (MG5)  1038 5 4.647 0.82 
Distribution of variables conditional on positive entries. Sales are measured in million real NOK, subsidies and R&D 
investments are measured in 1000 real NOK. All values are deflated by the consumer price index to base year 2000. 
4. Econometric analysis 
In the following, we apply two alternative approaches that utilise the available proposal evaluation 
data to try to estimate the causal effect of subsidies from the Research Council of Norway on 
intramural R&D in private firms.  
4.1. Baseline model 
To focus our discussion, we begin with a specification similar to equation (1), but with a continuous 
rather than a dichotomous subsidy variable.  
 
(2) ittiititit uXSY ++++= μαλβ  
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The dependent variable, Yit, is intramural R&D of firm i in year t, and Sit is the amount of R&D 
subsidies received from the Research Council of Norway by firm i in year t. Of the two measures we 
have of this variable, we chose to use the one that is self-reported by the firms (SR) as this matches the 
intramural R&D variable and the other subsidy variables in the sense that they all come out of the 
R&D surveys conducted by Statistics Norway. Other observed variables that affect R&D are contained 
in Xit. These are sales, subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public 
agencies (SG), and subsidies from EU bodies (SEU). Time effects, tμ , capture macroeconomic 
variations that affect all firms, and firm-specific fixed effects, iα , capture constant differences in 
R&D investment between firms over time. Other unobserved factors that influence Yit are captured by 
the error term, itu .  
 
The parameter of main interest is β, which measures the average effect of subsidies on intramural 
R&D from the Research Council. If β exceeds unity, there is positive additionality, i.e., one extra unit  
of subsidy causes firms to invest more than one extra unit in R&D. If β is smaller than one, subsidies 
partly crowd out private capital, i.e. firms use the subsidy to finance some of the R&D activity that 
would also have been carried out without the subsidy. A zero coefficient implies full crowding out. 
 
Recall that summary statistics showed substantial variation in sales and intramural R&D within the 
sample. This translates into a heteroskedasticity problem. It is common that R&D subsidy programmes 
include firms that vary considerably in scale, but the previous literature is remarkably silent as to 
whether and how this is handled.12 In order to reduce heteroskedasticity associated with differences in 
firm size, we weight the data using a simple method suggested by Park (1966). The weights are 
determined by first estimating equation (2) without weights and obtaining the coefficient on log sales 
in a regression of the log of the squared residuals on log sales. Dividing through in equation (2) by 
sales to the power of this coefficient/2 gives errors that are approximately homoskedastic.13 
 
Table 7, columns (1) and (2), show the results of estimating equation (2) in levels with and without 
firm fixed effects. A matching grants subsidy regime implies a linear relationship between R&D 
investments and subsidies. We follow e.g. Wallstein (2000) and Lach (2002) and use this as our main 
                                                     
12 An exception is Lerner (1999) who explicitly notes that the firms were of very different sizes and that a heteroskedasticity 
problem potentially existed. Because of this, he divides the firms into groups on the basis of sales and calculated 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard error. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) scale all variables with sales. 
13 Formal tests show that this procedure works very well compared both to no weighting and to scaling all variables with 
sales. We combine Park’s procedure with estimating heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, hence eliminating all 
heteroskedasticity is not imperative 
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functional form. The specification without fixed effects includes industry dummies at the two-digit 
NACE level. In column (1) Park’s (1966) procedure implies dividing the equation through by sales to 
the power of 0.16. In the fixed effects regression in column (2), Park’s weight is sales to the power of 
0.20. 
 
In Table 7, column (1), where we do not control for firm fixed effects, we get additionality estimates 
that are implausibly high. The coefficient associated with subsidies from the Research Council is 4.32. 
When we control for firm fixed effects, in column (2), the coefficient is reduced to 1.37. The fixed 
effects estimate implies that when firms receive one unit more in subsidies than they usually do, they 
do 1.37 unit more R&D. Most likely the high pooled OLS estimate reflects that firms that do more 
R&D receive more subsidies, i.e. a reversed causality problem.  We may also note that the 
additionality associated with EU grants is very high, 2.77. This is perhaps still implausibly high – but 
not very precisely estimated. The additionality associated with grants from ministries, Innovation 
Norway and other public agencies, 0.33, is very low. This is plausible as this includes contract R&D 
which is not primarily given with the aim to stimulate the firms’ own R&D investments. 
 
As an alternative to the linear specification, we apply a log-log model.14 The survey by David et al. 
(2000) shows that log-log is also a fairly common functional form in previous studies. Taking logs has 
the benefit of reducing problems with outliers and heteroskedasticity such that weighting has little 
effect on the estimates. However, this specification alters the interpretation of the relationship between 
the variables as the coefficient on log subsidy is an elasticity. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) show estimates of equation (2) in log-log form with and without fixed effects. 
The estimated elasticitites on subsidies from the Research Council are 0.42 using OLS and 0.22 when 
introducing firm fixed effects. We see again that the fixed effects estimate is substantially smaller than 
the pooled OLS estimates, consistent with the former being spuriously high because of omitted firm 
specific effects. The fixed effect estimate implies that a 1 % increase in the subsidy raises intramural 
R&D by 0.22 %. For a firm with initial intramural R&D and subsidy equal to the means presented in 
Table 6, the effect of a marginal increase in the subsidy of 1 % is about NOK 14600, and the implied 
increase in intramural R&D is about NOK 21900.15 Hence, a one-unit increase in the subsidy increases 
                                                     
14 The large number of zeros in intramural R&D and subsidies presents a specification problem. We use the approximation 
that ln(z)=0 if z=0, where z is a variable measured in 1000 real NOK. 
15 This number is based on mean intramural R&D for the 727 firms that receive subsidies and can be calculated using the 
share of subsidies in intramural R&D given in Table 6. 
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intramural R&D by about 1.5 units. This estimate at the mean is quite close to the fixed effects levels 
estimate of 1.4 in column (2). 
Table 7. Additionality estimates 
 Levels form Log-log form 
 Pooled OLS Within (FE) Pooled OLS Within (FE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SR 4.323*** 1.368*** .416*** .217*** 
 (1.349) (.412) (.0168) (.0210) 
SEU 7.761*** 2.774* .143*** .0604** 
 (1.726) (1.681) (.0310) (.0296) 
SG 1.508*** .339*** .360*** .307*** 
 (.0261) (.0748) (.0162) (.0222) 
Sales 4.173*** .544 .372*** .296*** 
 (.950) (.707) (.0366) (.0712) 
Sales squared -.00722* .00238   
 (.00376) (.00213)   
N 11368 11368 11368 11368 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 2570 
R-squared .348 .038 .212 .062 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. SR is R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. SEU is subsidies 
from EU bodies. SG is R&D subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies. All 
specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two-digit NACE group. We correct for 
heterskedasticity using Park’s (1966) procedure in the levels regression. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals 
by firms are reported in parentheses. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
We have done a series of robustness tests on Table 7. First, with respect to correction for 
heteroskedasticity, we find that the estimated additionality is sensitive to the choice of weights. In 
Table 7, column (2), the additionality estimate of 1.37 increases to 2.27 if no weights are applied, and 
it is reduced to 0.94 if we divide through in equation (2) with the square root of sales instead of the 
optimal Park’s weights as explained above. In light of this, it is interesting that correction for 
heteroskedacticity has received little attention in the previous literature. Second, with respect to 
sample criteria, the additionality estimate of 1.37 in Table 7, column (2), is reduced to 0.94 if 
observations with zero R&D are removed, and it is 1.14 if only firms that have applied for subsidies in 
the year of the observation are included. Finally, if we remove all observations with zero subsidies, we 
are not able to estimate positive additionality at all from the levels regression, and with the log-log 
specification in column (4), the additionality estimate is reduced from 0.22 to 0.11, significant at the 5 
%-level. Hence, the results depend critically on including firms that do not receive subsidies as a 
control group.16 
                                                     
16 This is probably the case for most additionality analyses, and is obviously the only source of identification for the many 
studies that rely on a dummy for whether firms receive subsidies or not. 
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4.2. Accounting for R&D intentions: A proxy variable approach 
A major concern when interpreting additionality estimates obtained from the models presented above, 
is that subsidies may be endogenous because of correlation with contemporaneous errors, even after 
eliminating firm fixed effects. We discussed this in Section 1, and in Section 2 it was formalised by 
having two time-varying error components ωit and εit in equation (1). The first component, ωit, 
represents the quality of current research ideas, or the intention to carry out R&D in the absence of 
subsidies. This intention may be correlated with the likelihood of applying for and receiving subsidies. 
 
We propose to account for ωit by a proxy variable solution, using the mean grade for Aspect 5, 
‘Commercial benefits’ (MG5it). Recall that MG5it is the average of grade 5 over all proposals that 
potentially spanned the current year for the given firm, as described in the data section. Aspect 5 is 
meant to measure the net financial gains from completing the project, although it is unclear whether or 
not this involves conditioning on taking the product to the market, or reaching some other threshold of 
success (see Appendix A). The proxy solution requires that MG5it is redundant in (2) with uit=ωit+εit 
once ωit is controlled for, and that (Xit, Sit, μt) are uncorrelated with ωit, conditional on MG5it.17 
Because MG5it is missing in some cases, we also include a dummy variable MG5MISSit that equals 
one if the firm applied this year and MG5 is missing. Note that ‘applied this year’ refers to years 
spanned by the projects applied for, not the years when proposals were submitted. In addition, a 
dummy REJECTit for ‘applied and all proposals rejected’ is included, because those who applied have 
demonstrated that they have an intention to carry out R&D (although perhaps not in the case of 
rejection).18 Hence, the reference category is ‘did not apply for funding this year’. The estimated 
equation then becomes 
 
(3) ittiititit XSY εμαϕϕϕλβ ~REJECTMG5MISSMG5 it3it2it1 +++++++= . 
                                                     
17 This is when the model is estimated with firm fixed effects. For pooled OLS, the firm fixed effects αi also needs to be 
uncorrelated with ωit conditional on the proxy. 
18 Kauko (1996) suggests that controlling for applications filed will solve the endogeneity problem. This, however, is only 
true to the extent that the firms' own evaluation of the R&D projects is not affected by the outcome of the application. 
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Table 8. Additionality estimates. Levels form. With proposal evaluations 
 Pooled OLS Within (FE) estimator 
 
All firms All firms All firms 
Firms that applied 
in at least one year 
Firms with variation 
in MG5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SR 2.756** 1.275*** 1.257*** 1.458** 1.126 
 (1.181) (.433) (.434) (.612) (.837) 
SEU 7.947*** 2.727 2.722 3.396 1.769 
 (1.78) (1.692) (1.693) (2.173) (1.775) 
SG 1.486*** .340*** .340*** .326*** .312*** 
 (.0277) (.0753) (.0750) (.0691) (.0657) 
Sales 3.946*** .539 .542 .757 .788 
 (.920) (.704) (.704) (1.698) (2.073) 
Sales squared -.00628* .00240 .00240 .00192 .00168 
 (.00363) (.00212) (.00212) (.00481) (.00584) 
MG5 2262*** 192.8 634.1* 59.73 -64.05 
 (440) (179.7) (343.4) (176.2) (304.5) 
MG11   -434.4   
   (277.5)   
MG5MISS 3537* 293.5 1213 307.2 154.1 
 (1812) (873.3) (947.7) (776) (2140) 
REJECT -2125 -701.2 -859 -370.4 650.4 
 (1817) (1165) (1094) (1132) (2357) 
N 11368 11368 11368 2208 729 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 406 122 
R-squared .368 .037 .037 .061 .058 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. SR is R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. SEU is subsidies 
from EU bodies. SG is R&D subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies. MG5 is the 
evaluation grade on Aspect 5, ‘Commercial benefits’. MG11 is the evaluation grade on Aspect 11, ‘Total evaluation’. 
REJECT implies that the firm applied for subsidies, but had the application rejected by the Research Council. All 
specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two-digit NACE groups. We correct for 
heterskedasticity using Park’s (1966) procedure. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firms are reported in 
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 8 shows results of estimating the levels model based on equation (3). We find the pooled OLS 
results in column (1). The coefficient for MG5 is positive and highly significant. A one-unit increase 
in the commercial-benefits-grade is associated with an increase in intramural R&D of NOK 2.3 
million, which is about 24 % for a firm with average R&D. The coefficient for MG5it missing is 
marginally significant, and corresponds to an average grade around 1.6.19 This is very low. The 
rejection dummy is negative, suggesting that rejected applicants tend to invest less in R&D than other 
                                                     
19 This is seen by dividing 3537 by 2262. 
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firms, including non-applicants. This is reasonable as they receive a signal that they have low-quality 
proposals. The additionality estimate associated with subsidies from the Research Council, is 2.75. 
This is suspiciously high, but much lower than the corresponding estimate in Table 7. Hence, using the 
grade for commercial benefit as a proxy for unobserved R&D intentions, does seem to reduce the 
omitted variable bias in pooled OLS. 
 
When including firm fixed effects in column (2), the explanatory power of the proposal data vanishes. 
This shows that it is the cross-sectional variation that drives the significance in the model without 
fixed effects. At 1.28, the additionality point estimate is also quite close to the fixed effects estimate 
without using evaluation data, which was 1.37. Because Aspect 5 may not pick up all relevant 
information about the firms’ R&D intentions, we include in column (3) the mean of grades for Aspect 
11, ‘Total evaluation’. However, this grade does not seem to add any information about R&D 
investment, although MG5 now becomes marginally significant. Experimenting with other grades 
leads to the same conclusion. 
 
Many firms never apply for R&D subsidies, and these are on average small firms with little R&D 
investments. In Column (4) we limit the sample to firms that applied for subsidies at least once during 
the data period, in case these have different parameters. Despite the much smaller sample size, the 
additionality estimate is fairly stable. It increases to 1.46, and naturally looses precision. The grade 
variables are still insignificant. Finally, in column (5), we restrict the sample further, and only use 
firms that have applied more than once and have variation in the MG5-variable. These are the firms 
that contribute directly to identifying the grade coefficient. In this sample of 122 firms the coefficient 
on MG5it is negative and still insignificant. We also note a drop in estimated additionality. The 
coefficient is 1.13 and insignificant. 
 
In Table 9, we report the same analyses as in Table 8 for the log-log specification. Introducing the 
proxy for R&D intensions in pooled OLS reduces the estimated elasticity of intramural R&D with 
respect to Research Council subsidies from 0.42 to 0.31. This suggests again that evaluation data do 
reduce endogeneity in cross-sectional regressions. The coefficients on MG5it and MG5MISSit are 
positive and significant. A one-unit increase in the grade is associated with a 29 % increase in 
intramural R&D. This is a substantial effect and consistent with the idea that firms with high quality 
projects will invest more in R&D than others even without subsidies. We may also note that the size of 
the estimate is similar to what we found in the levels form regression for a firm with average R&D 
investments. REJECTit is positive and insignificant in this specification. The results in column (2) 
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confirm the level analysis in Table 8. The fixed effects additionality estimates are virtually unaffected 
by the proxy variable approach, and all the grade variables are insignificant. Dropping firms that never 
applied to the Research Council has little impact on the estimates, while using only the few firms with 
variation in MG5 reduces the estimated subsidy elasticity to half. The coefficient of MG5it remains 
insignificant and close to zero. 
 
We conclude that with the available data and within a fixed effects framework, there is little to gain 
from adding grades from proposal evaluations. 
Table 9. Additionality estimates, models in log-log form. With proposal evaluations 
 Pooled OLS Within (FE) estimator 
 
All firms All firms All firms 
Firms that applied 
in at least one 
year 
Firms with 
variation in MG5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln SR .306*** .220*** .221*** .190*** .099*** 
 (.0217) (.0215) (.0215) (.0252) (.0323) 
ln SEU .135*** .0675** .0666** .0787** .0544 
 (.0294) (.0294) (.0294) (.0342) (.0423) 
ln SG .348*** .305*** .305*** .136*** .0505 
 (.0158) (.022) (.0220) (.0266) (.0318) 
ln sales .329*** .301*** .301*** .599*** .590*** 
 (.0359) (.0712) (.0712) (.132) (.201) 
MG5 .289*** .00344 .0386 .0118 -.0147 
 (.0418) (.0431) (.0924) (.0437) (.0751) 
MG11   -.0344   
   (.0771)   
MG5MISS 1.098*** -.423 -.372 -.382 .0704 
 (.274) (.2852) (.305) (.284) (.397) 
REJECT .0741 .271 .257 .188 -.0918 
 (.215) (.205) (.208) (.206) (.226) 
N 11368 11368 11368 2208 729 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 406 122 
R-squared .221 .059 .059 .087 .0819 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). SR is R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. SEU is subsidies 
from EU bodies. SG is R&D subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies. MG5 is the 
evaluation grade on Aspect 5, ‘Commercial benefits’. MG11 is the evaluation grade on Aspect 11, ‘Total evaluation’. 
REJECT implies that the firm applied for subsidies, but had the application rejected by the Research Council. All 
specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two-digit NACE groups. Standard errors 
allowing for clustering of residuals by firms are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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4.3. Accounting for R&D intentions: Using a lagged dependent variable 
The models presented above ignore potential adjustment costs and that projects often span two or 
more calendar years. Adjustment costs imply that past R&D investment affect current investment 
conditional on current values of the control variables.20 The problem can be handled by including 
lagged R&D investments as a regressor, and 12 out of 39 studies used in the meta-analysis by Garcia-
Quevedo (2004) use a specification of this type.  
 
As pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 5.3), it can be challenging to separate fixed effects 
and lagged dependent variables in applied work. They recommend trying out both specifications to 
check robustness. The interpretation of the coefficients on the subsidy differs, however, in an 
important way. With adjustment costs (represented by a lagged dependent variable), the long-run 
effect of increasing the subsidy exceeds the short-run effect; whereas if the persistence in R&D is 
attributed to a fixed effect, the impact of increasing the subsidy for one period only lasts one period.  
 
It is plausible that there are both fixed effects and adjustment costs in R&D investments. With fixed 
effects, however, the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous, and the best empirical approach 
would be to use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator to account for the lagged dependent variable and 
eliminate the fixed effects. Because this technique makes use of at least two lags of the data, and the 
within-firm variation in key variables is limited in our data set, we are forced to leave out fixed effects 
when including lagged intramural R&D. Lagged intramural R&D will account for part of the fixed 
effects and allows us to exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data, in particular in the proposal 
evaluations.  
 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that if a model erroneously is estimated with fixed effects instead of 
a lagged dependent variable, the estimated ‘treatment effect’ of an intervention will be overestimated. 
However, if the model is estimated using a lagged dependent variable when one should have used a 
fixed effect, the treatment effect is underestimated. Hence, estimates from a model with a lagged 
dependent variable and a model with fixed effects may under certain assumptions be seen as the lower 
and upper bounds of the true treatment effects. In this respect, a dynamic specification complements 
our fixed effects analysis. 
 
We estimate the following model, where we apply the proxy variable approach combined with lagged 
R&D as a right-hand side variable: 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., David et al., 2000, section 2.6, for a discussion. 
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(4) ittiitititit XSYY εμαϕϕϕλβθ ~REJECTMG5MISSMG5 it3it2it11 ++++++++= −  
 
We also estimate a corresponding model for the log-log form. The long run effect of a marginal 
increase in the subsidy is in this case β/(1-θ). 
Table 10. Models with lagged dependent variable 
 Levels form Levels form Log-log form Log-log form 
 All firms 
Firms with 
variation in MG5 
All firms 
Firms with 
variation in MG5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intramural R&Dt-1 .840*** .737*** .557*** .426*** 
 (.089) (.143) (.0112) (.0664) 
SR 1.034** 1.562* .166*** .107*** 
 (.425) (.933) (.0168) (.0278) 
SEU .604 1.148 .0274 -.0110 
 (.746) (1.515) (.0194) (.0210) 
SG .555*** .637*** .208*** .0235 
 (.108) (.148) (.0139) (.0196) 
Sales .301 .600 .213*** .261*** 
 (.345) (1.114) (.0255) (.0624) 
Sales squared .00202** .00156   
 (.00102) (.00354)   
MG5 418.4** 340.5 .0950*** .0681 
 (201.8) (358.5) (.0274) (.0536) 
MG5MISS 310 -1742 .188 .417 
 (999.7) (3480) (.186) (.328) 
REJECT -474.9 -427.5 -.0136 -.277 
 (885.8) (2699) (.164) (.182) 
N 7793 591 7793 591 
Number of firms 2319 120 2319 120 
R-squared .854 .894 .463 .642 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. SR is R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. SEU is subsidies 
from EU bodies. SG is R&D subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies. MG5 is the 
evaluation grade on Aspect 5, ´Commercial benefits’. MG11 is the evaluation grade on Aspect 11, ´Total evaluation’. 
REJECT implies that the firm applied for subsidies, but had the application rejected by the Research Council. All 
specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two-digit NACE groups. We correct for 
heteroskedasticity using Park’s (1966) procedure in the levels regression. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals 
by firms are reported in parentheses. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 10 displays the results from estimating equation (4) in levels and logs. Beginning with the levels 
regression in columns (1) and (2), lagged intramural R&D has a large coefficient which means that 
adjustment costs and persistence in R&D investment are large. However, the omitted fixed effects 
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probably inflate the estimate. For the other variables, we see that the results are quite similar to the 
fixed effects estimates in Table 8. The estimated additionality is 1.03 in column (1) and 1.56 in 
column (2). The small subsample of firms with variation in MG5it now gives the largest additionality 
estimate, while in Table 8 this sample produced the smallest estimate. This instability may simply be 
due to the small sample size and low precision.  
 
The implied long run effects are very large, 6.5 and 5.9, respectively. Given that we most likely have 
an omitted fixed effect that is correlated with the included lagged dependent variable, however, we 
should not put too much emphasis on the long-run effects.  
 
Following the reasoning of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and combining the estimated contemporaneous 
effect, 2β , from column (1) in this model and the corresponding fixed effects estimates in Table 8, 
column (2), suggests that the true short-run additionality effect is within the interval 1.030 to 1.275 
with a mid-point of 1.15. 
 
With the log-log specification, the estimates in Table 10, columns (3) and (4), also reveal considerable 
persistence in R&D investments. The contemporaneous elasticities are fairly close to the fixed effects 
estimates. For all firms, the interval suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009) is 0.17 to 0.22. The 
estimated long-run elasticities range from 0.19 to 0.37. Interestingly, MG5 is significant in column (1) 
and (3), but the significance disappears when the sample is restricted to firms that have variation in 
MG5. This suggests that the effect of MG5 in columns (1) and (3) is driven by between-firm variation. 
4.5. Measurement error bias 
In Section 3.3, we demonstrated that the subsidy measures contain measurement error. When both the 
available measures are positive, the correlation between them is only 0.70.  
 
Because we have two measures of the same subsidy, SR and SC, we may use one as an instrument for 
the other to reduce measurement error bias, provided that they are only correlated through the true 
subsidy (see, e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994 or Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001). Because 
the two observed measures tend to coincide on the value zero (we have many more observations with 
a zero subsidy than with a positive subsidy), the two measurement errors are correlated.21 However, 
this is unconditional on the included variables. By accounting for whether or not the firm has applied 
                                                     
21 Another situation that will take us outside the classical measurement error model is if total subsidies are measured 
correctly, but distributed erroneously on the three subsidy variables included in our regression. 
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for support in a given year through the grade variables and for rejection, we eliminate some of this 
correlation. We apply the IV solution, using SC as an instrument for SR, to both the levels and log-log 
forms, with and without fixed effects, see Tables 11 and 12. For comparison we include the results 
from the corresponding regressions in Tables 8 and 9 where we did not attempt to correct for 
measurement errors. 
Table 11. IV estimation to correct for measurement error. Levels form 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Within (FE) Within (FE) 
Instrument: None SC None SC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SR (endogenous) 2.756** 11.100*** 1.275*** 2.591* 
 (1.181) (3.493) (.433) (1.502) 
SEU 7.947*** 4.051 2.727 2.523 
 (1.780) (3.006) (1.692) (1.642) 
SG 1.486*** 1.463*** .340*** .336*** 
 (.0277) (.056) (.0753) (.0729) 
Sales 3.946*** 3.835*** .539 .526 
 (.920) (.863) (.704) (.702) 
Sales squared -.00628* -.00642* .00240 .00236 
 (.00363) (.00339) (.00212) (.00211) 
MG5 2262*** 803.9 192.8 79.4 
 (440) (568.5) (179.7) (256.7) 
MG5MISS 3537* -628 293.5 425.9 
 (1812) (2315) (873.3) (893.4) 
REJECT -2125 3582 -701.2 -286.7 
 (1817) (2290) (1165) (1384) 
Coefficients on instrument in first stage:     
SC  .468***  .502*** 
  (.0784)  (.0928) 
N 11368 11368 11368 11368 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 2570 
R-squared .368 .312 .0367 .069 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for 
twodigit NACE groups. Weighted using Park’s optimal weight. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firm 
are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0 
 
Using the levels form, we see that the additionality estimates increase by a factor of about four when 
using pooled OLS, and by a factor of about two when using fixed effects. The direction is as expected, 
but the magnitude is too large to be plausible, and suggests that there are unresolved biases. Using the 
log-log specification, we get about a 30 % increase in the coefficient when using IV on the 
specification without fixed effects, but in the fixed effects specification the coefficient becomes small 
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and insignificant when using IV. We have no explanation for this, but given the large standard error of 
the coefficient, it might be coincidental. 
 
In general, we must conclude that our attempt to use IV estimation to correct for measurement errors 
has limited success. Most likely, this is because the assumptions behind the classical errors-in-
variables model are not fulfilled. We have experimented with several alternative specifications and 
subsamples without obtaining any robust findings. Despite this, something has still been learned from 
the two measures of subsidies, as we have demonstrated that there are severe measurement errors in 
the data. Statistics Norway collect business enterprise R&D data following the same procedures as the 
rest of the OECD, and it is therefore no reason to think that the data quality is much different in other 
countries. This implies that additionality estimates that do not correct for measurement errors are 
likely to have a large negative bias. 
Table 12. IV estimation to correct for measurement error. Log-log form 
 Pooled OLS Within (FE) 
Instrument: None ln SC None ln SC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln SR (endogenous) .306*** .397*** .220*** .117 
 (.0217) (.115) (.0215) (.142) 
ln SEU .1349*** .103** .0675** .0853* 
 (.0294) (.0478) (.0294) (.0493) 
ln SG .348*** .340*** .305*** .296*** 
 (.0158) (.0192) (.022) (.0240) 
ln sales .329*** .326*** .301*** .266*** 
 (.0359) (.0360) (.0712) (.0701) 
MG5 .289*** .231*** .00344 .0314 
 (.0418) (.0816) (.0431) (.0728) 
MG5MISS 1.098*** .890** -.423 -.365 
 (.274) (.354) (.285) (.322) 
REJECT .0741 .298 .271 .125 
 (.215) (.346) (.205) (.303) 
Coefficients on instrument in first stage:     
ln SC  .5996***  .500*** 
  (.0678)  (.0895) 
N 11368 11368 11368 11368 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 2570 
R-squared .221 .220 .059 .069 
The dependent variable is ln(intramural R&D). All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies 
for two-digit NACE groups. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firms are reported in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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5. Conclusion 
Empirical examination of whether R&D subsidies to private firms crowd out private investments has 
been hampered by problems related to selection bias. In particular, subsidies may be endogenous even 
after eliminating firm fixed effects because the quality of current research ideas may be correlated with 
the likelihood of applying for and receiving subsidies. Access to proposal evaluation data has been 
suggested as a potential remedy. Using such data we do not find strong evidence suggesting that this 
type of selection creates a severe bias. Proposal evaluation grades from the Research Council of 
Norway strongly predict R&D investments in cross-sectional regressions, with a one-unit increase in 
grade being associated with an increase in intramural R&D between 20 and 30 %. There is, however, 
limited variation in the proposal evaluation grades within firms over time. Evaluation grades are by no 
means a perfect measure of project quality, but our findings suggests that unobserved project quality is 
largely absorbed by firm fixed effects. Selection bias is therefore not likely to be a major issue when 
panel data are available. 
 
Our best estimate of the short-run additionality of R&D subsidies from the Research Council of 
Norway is 1.15, i.e.,  a one-unit increase in the subsidy increases total R&D expenditure in the 
recipient firm by somewhat more than one unit. This is slightly higher than the fixed effects estimate 
in Klette and Møen (2012) using similar Norwegian data from the years 1982-1995. The point 
estimates we obtain are somewhat sensitive to specification choices, but there are very few estimates 
below one. Using log-log specifications our best estimate for the elasticity of R&D with respect to 
subsidies is about 0.20. 
 
We have demonstrated that there is severe measurement error in the subsidy variable. Additionality is 
therefore likely to be underestimated. We conclude that measurement errors may be a more important 
source of bias than selection, and that better subsidy data are imperative in order to improve the 
additionality estimates. 
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Appendix A: Assessment criteria for the proposals 
 Aspect Evaluated by Description 
A1 General project 
quality 
Expert 
Panel 
General project quality is an expression of how well the project complies 
with the requirements that should be posed to every project, independent of 
project content and type. Project quality includes project content and the 
applicants. 
A2 Level of 
innovation 
Expert 
Panel 
The term “innovation” is to be understood in the context of value creation. 
Evaluation will be focused on the level of innovation compared with the 
“state-of-the-art” in a field; e.g., at the corporate level, in a particular industry 
or in a global context. 
A3 Research content Expert 
Panel 
This criterion will be used to rank the project on a scale ranging from simple 
development work to advanced scientific research. Evaluation will be 
focused on the extent to which the project produces new knowledge of 
significance for professional development in the field covered by the 
research, and the status of the project with regard to the international research 
frontier. 
A4 International 
cooperation 
Research 
council 
administrators 
Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which the project will contribute 
to the internationalisation of Norwegian research and/or industry in the 
relevant field, and the plans for accomplishing this. Furthermore, 
consideration will be given to whether the selection of international partners 
will help to enhance the project's quality and feasibility. 
A5 Commercial 
benefits 
Expert 
Panel 
Evaluation will be focused on the project's potential benefits for the 
participating enterprises. The potential refers to anticipated financial gains as 
a result of industrialisation and commercialisation, and will be compared 
with the aggregate expenses for the entire period (i.e. beyond the R&D 
project's duration and expenses per se). 
A6 Relevance and 
benefit to society 
Expert 
Panel 
Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which a project is relevant to 
society; e.g., by considering its ability to contribute to 
knowledge/competence that would in the short or long term be of 
significance to meeting major challenges in the public sector, industry and 
the civil society, viewed in a regional, national or global context. 
A7 Risk Research 
council 
administrators  
Evaluation will be focused on assessing the extent to which different factors 
may be expected to inhibit the success of the R&D project, and the planned 
exploitation of the results. 
A8 Other conditions Research 
council 
administrators 
Characteristics of the project that are not directly addressed by the other 
aspects and that could be relevant to the evaluation of the project. 
A9 Additionality Research 
council 
administrators 
Evaluation will be focused on the extent to which support from the Research 
Council will trigger inputs, actions, results and effects assumed not to be 
feasible without the support 
A10 Relevance 
relative to the 
call for proposals 
Research 
council 
administrators 
The project will be evaluated in relation to the guidelines set out in the call 
for proposals for the relevant activity/programme. 
A11 Total evaluation Research 
council 
administrators 
 
All aspects except A7 (Risk) and A8 (Other conditions) are evaluated on a scale from 1 to 7. 
Source: The Research Council of Norway 
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Appendix B: Applications of the regression discontinuity design in 
studies evaluating the effect of R&D support 
This appendix briefly summarises five studies evaluating R&D subsidy schemes using a regression 
discontinuity design. An early regression discontinuity study that pre-dates Jaffe’s (2002) article is 
Carter et al. (1987). Carter et al. evaluate how the careers and accomplishments of Research Career 
Development Award (RCDA) recipients compare with other researchers. They find that the RCDA 
programme supports persons who become outstanding researchers, but this is because the programme 
is able to target them, it is not a causal effect. RCDA is a programme under the US National Institutes 
of Health (NIH). 
 
Jacob and Lefgren (2011) estimate the impact of receiving grants from the NIH on subsequent 
publications and citations. Using both OLS and regression discontinuity on a sample of all 
applications from 1980 to 2000, they find that the receipt of either an NIH postdoctoral fellowship or a 
standard research grant leads to about one additional publication over the next five years. They suggest 
that this modest effect on productivity is due to low input additionality. The difference in the number 
of funding sources between grant winners and losers in their sample is not statistically significant, and 
hence, it seems that NIH grant receipt displaces other funding. As noted by Jacob and Lefgren, this 
result does not imply that NIH research funding is not valuable. When overall funding is in fixed 
supply, support from one specific source may increase the total amount of R&D without having an 
impact on the marginal applicant. 
 
In a similar study, Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) analyse the impact of the Chilean National 
Science and Technology Research Fund (FONDECYT) on scientific production. Using a regression 
discontinuity design on projects submitted for funding between 1988 and 1995, they do not find any 
significant impact of the programme, neither in terms of publications, nor in terms of the quality of 
publications in the proximity of the programme threshold ranking. Like Jacob and Lefgren (2011) they 
attribute this lack of success to the possibility that the researchers and projects targeted by the 
programme have access to alternative funding opportunities. 
 
Serrano-Velarde (2008) uses quantile regressions and regression discontinuity to estimate the impact 
of R&D subsidies on firm R&D investment under the French ANVAR programme. Rather than using 
a discontinuity related to proposal evaluation grades, however, Serrano-Velarde utilises a discontinuity 
resulting from programme specific eligibility requirements related to the form of ownership. He finds 
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that subsidies to large R&D investors crowd out private R&D investment, while subsidies to small 
R&D investors add to their private investments. 
 
Bronzini and Iachini (2011) also analyse commercial R&D and are in spirit very close to Jaffe (2002) 
even though he is not cited as a source of inspiration. They evaluate a program for industrial research, 
innovation and technology transfer put in place in a region of Northern Italy in 2003. Grants are based 
on an assessment carried out by a committee of independent experts that is appointed by the regional 
government. Projects that obtain a score of at least 75 on a scale from 0 to 100 receive a grant. This 
allows Bronzini and Iachini to apply a sharp regression discontinuity design in order to compare the 
performance of subsidised and non-subsidised firms close to the threshold. They do not have access to 
data on the firms’ R&D investments, but use balance sheet variables that are associated with R&D 
outlays reimbursable by the program. More specifically, they use intangible, tangible and total 
investments as their main outcome variable, and also look at labour costs, employment level and 
service costs. By letting the outcome variables be a function of the score, the average treatment effect 
of the program is assessed through the estimated value of the discontinuity at the threshold. They use 
both parametric and non-parametric methods. When using the full sample of firms, they cannot reject 
the hypothesis that firms substitute public for privately financed R&D, in which case the program does 
not create additional investments. However, when they explore heterogeneity, they find evidence 
suggesting that small firms do increase their investments substantially, on average by the same amount 
as the subsidy they receive. 
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Appendix C: Accounting for R&D intentions using an instrumen-
tal variables approach 
In addition to the two approaches reported in the main article, we have also tried to solve the selection 
problem using instrumental variable estimation. This approach did not succeed, but we report the 
results here for completeness. The idea is as follows. Conditional on commercial benefits, evaluation 
Aspect 6, ‘Relevance and benefit to society’, should not affect the private decision to invest in R&D. It 
should, however, affect the decision of the granting authority, both in terms of whether or not to grant 
a subsidy, and in terms of the amount granted. We also try using the total evaluation grade (MG11) as 
an instrument because it captures other aspects of the proposal that are valued by the granting 
authority. We stress that this assumption contradicts the assumption motivating the inclusion of MG11 
in Table 8, that MG11 might capture something more than MG5 about the value of projects for firms.  
Table C1. IV estimation for endogenous subsidy. Levels form 
 Pooled OLS Within (FE) estimator 
Instrument: none MG6 MG11 None MG6 MG11 
  (1) (2)  (4) (5) 
SR (endogenous) 2.756** 14.080* 8.434 1.275*** -1.228 .586 
 (1.181) (7.404) (9.930) (.433) (3.371) (1.613) 
SEU 7.947*** 2.660 5.298 2.727 3.178 2.867* 
 (1.780) (4.275) (5.004) (1.692) (1.975) (1.737) 
SG 1.486*** 1.454*** 1.470*** .340*** .349*** .343*** 
 (.028) (.0628) (.0557) (.0753) (.0825) (.0786) 
Sales 3.946*** 3.796*** 3.870*** .539 .539 .532 
 (.920) (.846) (.890) (.704) (.702) (.703) 
Sales squared -.00628* -.00647* -.00638* .00240 .00253 .00245 
 (.00363) (.00333) (.00346) (.00212) (.00214) (.00211) 
MG5 2262*** 283.5 1270 192.8 554.5 325 
 (440) (1110) (1856) (179.7) (470.4) (287.8) 
MG5MISS 3537* -2115 704.2 293.5 638.4 532.3 
 (1812) (4189) (5146) (873.3) (954.7) (1009) 
REJECT -2125 5620 1757 -701.2 -1820 -1078 
 (1817) (5048) (7294) (1165) (1665) (1560) 
Coefficients on instruments in first stage:       
MG6  184.6***   152.7**  
  (62.10)   (71.13)  
MG11   43.75*   -27.18 
   (26.34)   (53.93) 
N 11368 11368 11368 11368 11368 11368 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570 
R-squared .368 .265 .342 .037 .019 .036 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for 
2-digit NACE group. Weighted using Park’s optimal weight. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firm are 
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table C2. IV estimation for endogenous subsidy. Log-log form 
 Pooled OLS-IV Fixed effects-IV 
Instrument: none MG6 MG11 none MG6 MG11 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln SR (endogenous) .306*** .665** .246 .220*** .0338 -.0851 
 (.0217) (.288) (.491) (.0215) (.448) (.650) 
ln SEU .135*** .00868 .156 .0675** .111 .146 
 (.0294) (.107) (.176) (.0294) (.139) (.200) 
ln SG .348*** .316*** .353*** .305*** .303*** .311*** 
 (.0158) (.0312) (.0464) (.0220) (.0396) (.0529) 
ln sales .329*** .319*** .330*** .301*** .268*** .270*** 
 (.0359) (.0371) (.0380) (.0712) (.0714) (.0729) 
MG5 .289*** .0632 .326 .00344 .0677 .119 
 (.0418) (.185) (.311) (.0431) (.202) (.290) 
MG5MISS 1.098*** .284 1.234 -.423 -.256 -.101 
 (.274) (.697) (1.147) (.285) (.651) (.899) 
REJECT .0741 .951 -.0729 .271 -.0202 -.227 
 (.215) (.729) (1.220) (.205) (.806) (1.154) 
Coefficients on instruments in first stage:       
MG6  .422***   .241**  
  (.101)   (.115)  
MG11   .164**   .122* 
   (.0639)   (.0684) 
N 11368 11368 11368 11368 11368 11368 
Number of firms 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570 
R-squared .221 .207 .221 .059 .066 .057 
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for 
2-digit NACE group. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firm are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
We apply the IV models both to the pooled OLS and to the fixed effects models, while maintaining the 
proxy variable approach. Table C1 shows the results for the levels equations while Table C2 shows the 
results for the log-log form. The coefficients of the instruments in the first stage regressions are at the 
bottom of the tables. For comparison we include the results from the corresponding regressions in 
Table 8 and 10 where subsidies were not instrumented. Generally, the instruments do not work well. 
The instruments are significant in the first stage regressions in seven out of eight specifications, but 
the estimated additionality coefficients tend to be either implausible high (OLS) or insignificant in the 
second stage regressions (FE). We have also tried combining the two instruments without having any 
more success. 
From:
Statistics Norway
Postal address:
PO Box  8131 Dept
NO-0033 Oslo
Ofﬁ ce address:
Kongens gate 6, Oslo
Oterveien 23, Kongsvinger
E-mail: ssb@ssb.no
Internet: www.ssb.no
Telephone: + 47 62 88 50 00
ISSN 0809-733X
B Return to:Statistisk sentralbyråNO-2225 Kongsvinger
D
esig
n
: Siri B
o
q
u
ist
